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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The procedural posture of the case before the court on
appeal is as follows, Taylor National Inc. ("Taylor National"),
the plaintiff real estate brokerage, sued defendant Jensen
Brothers Construction Company ( "JBC") seeking to recover a
real estate commission in the amount of $8,400.00, which Taylor
National claimed to be due it as a commission on the sale of a
house constructed and owned by JBC.

The house was sold to

third party defendant Leon Harward, also a real estate agent,
in the employ of Continental Value Realty, a brokerage owned by
third party defendants Harrison and Soule, to whom JBC claimed
to have paid the real estate commission with the understanding
that he would make suitable arrangements for splitting the
commission with Taylor National, Inc., the listing realtor.
JBC made a third party claim against Harward, Harrison
and Soule claiming that if JBC owed a commission to Taylor
National, third party defendants owed the same amount to JBC.
Subsequent to the commencement of suit, JBC gave notice of
default to Leon Harward on a Trust Deed Note which secured
part of the purchase price of the residence and sought to
exercise the power of sale and the Trust Deed which secured
the Note.

Harward prevailed on the court to restrain exercise

of the :EX>Wer of sale on the Trust Deed and subsequently counterclaimed against JBC seeking damages for claimed breaches of
implied warranties in the construction of the house, for fraud
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in allegedly failing to advise Harward that the subdivision in
which the house was located had not been properly accepted
by the city of Orem, and for reformation of the Trust Deed
Note to reflect the alleged agreement by JBC that it would
take only property in payment of the Note and not insist on
payment in money.
After a trial to the court, the trial court entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and its Judgment
awarding Taylor National recovery against JBC for the real
estate commission and awarding JBC recovery over against
Harward, Harrison and Soule for the amount of the real estate
commission.

The court found for JBC and against Harward,

no cause of action, on his counterclaims.

The court stayed

execution of Taylor National's judgment against JBC on equitable grounds, but allowed Taylor National to execute over
against Harward, Harrison and Soule on JBC's third party
judgment against them.
On this appeal, the appellant Harward (and presumably
Harrison and Soule), attack the court's ruling that Taylor
National may execute over against Harward, et al., on JBC's
third party judgment against them on the ground that Taylor
National is not legally entitled to recover a commission from
the buyer of a listed property, but must recover it from the
seller.

Brief of Appellant, Point II.

In Point III of his

brief, Harward apparently attacks the trial court's judgment

-2-
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in

that Taylor National was entitled a commission from JBC.
Harward, however, does not put at issue before this court
the trial court's judgment over against Harward, Harrison
and Soule on JBC's third party complaint.

Therefore, JBC

does not respond in this brief to the arguments and contentions contained in Points II and III of the Brief of Appellant,
but responds only to Points IV, V, VI and VII, in which Harward directly attacks the court's judgment in favor of JBC
and against Harward on JBC's Third Party Complaint and Harward's Third Party Counterclaim.
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent takes issue with many of the statements
contained in the appellant's statement of facts, but because
t·

of the complexity of the factual context of this appeal, the
respondent has chosen to avoid duplication by setting forth
the facts it deems pertinent to this appeal as part of the
argument section of its brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
JBC AND AGAINST HARWARD, NO CAUSE OF
ACTION, ON HIS CLAIMS OF BREACH OF IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF HABITABILITY AND WORKMANSHIP
IN CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE MUST BE UPHELD
ON APPEAL.
The trial court's judgment in favor of the Third Party
Counterclaim defendants JBC on claims of breach of implied
warranties in construction of the Barrington House should be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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upheld by this court; first, because the judgment is properly
supported by unchallenged findings of fact and second, because those findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence.
A.

The Trial Court's Judgment in JBC's Favor is
Properly Supported by Unchallenged Findings
of Fact.

In Point IV of his Brief of Appellant, Harward attacks
no specific Finding of Fact nor Conclusion of Law, but apparently only the judgment of the trial court in favor of JBC
and against Harward, no cause of action, as to those portions
of Harward's Counterclaim, Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint (as amended) claiming that JBC breached implied warranties of habitability and workmanship in construction of
the Barrington house.

See Brief of Appellant at 74; Amended

Judgment, paragraph 4, R. 300; Third Party Counterclaim and
Complaint, Count 5 "Warranty of Habitability," R. 38;

Amend-

ment to Third Party Complaint of Defendants Harrison, Soule
and Harward, paragraph 19 b, R. 186-87.
In failing to specifically challenge any particular
finding of fact or conclusion of law, Harward is bound on
appeal by those findings and conclusions made by the trial
court, and the only question for review is whether they support the challenged judgment.

State ex rel. New Mexico

Water Quality Control Comm. v. City of Hobbs, 525 P.2d 371,
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373-374 (N.M. 1974).

An example of the application of this

rule is found in Lakeside Pump & Equirnent, Inc., v. Austin
Construction Co., 576 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1978), where both plaintiff and defendant in a contract dispute cross-appealed portions of a judgment by challenging certain of the trial
court's conclusions of law.

The Supreme Court noted:

In making their respective contentions, both
parties rely heavily on factual arguments,
quoting frequently from the trial testimony as
to the content of the bid. Our inquiry, however,
is narrowly limited by the failure of either
party to assign error to the trial court's findings of fact.
Since no challenge was made to
any finding of fact by either party, the trial
court's findings became the established facts of
the case. We must decide only whether the challenged conclusions of law are supported by the
court's findings of fact.
(Citation omitted).
Id. at 394.

The Utah Supreme Court applied a similar rule in

Coon v. Utah Construction Co., 228 P.2d 997, 998 (Utah 1951 ).
The issue in the instant case, therefore, is whether the
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law support its judgment.

See City of Hobbs, supra.

An examination of the applicable findings shows that
they are supportive of the court's judgment.

Finding of

Fact No. 18(e) of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law states that:
(e) The evidence was insufficient to find
the Barrington House was not constructed in a
workmanlike manner.
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R. 291.

The court also found that there was insufficient

v

evidence to support Count

of Harward's Counterclaim, which

alleged breach of an implied warranty of habitability.

Find-

ing of Fact 18(f), R. 291.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Horton v. Driver-Miller
Plumbing, Inc., 414 P.2d 219 (N.M. 1966), held that a negative finding very similar to 18(e) and (f} in the instant
case, when not challenged was conclusive on appeal.

The

case involved a claim by the plaintiff apartment-building
owner that the defendant plumbing contractor had breached
express and implied warranties of fitness for use, when pipes
it had installed developed pinhole leaks after several months.
In challenging the judgment in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff took exception to certain of the court's findings
of fact but not others.

The Supreme Court upheld the judg-

ment, noting as to one important unchallenged finding:
The trial court expressly found that the
appellants "failed to show a breach of warranty
on the part of the defendant." This particular
finding is not one of those which apellants specifically attacked as being unsupported by the
evidence. A finding not specifically attacked
and set aside by this Court is conclusive on
appeal.
(Citations omitted).
Id. at 222.
In the instant case, the trial court's unchallenged
findings that there was insufficient evidence that JBC had
breached either the warranty of habitability or of workmanship

-6-
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in the constructon of the house are binding on appeal.

Those

findings provide ample support for the trial court's judgment
of no cause of action on Harward's claims of breach of the
implied warranties set forth in his Third-Party Counterclaim
as Amended.
Nevertheless, should the Court determine that the appropriate findings of fact have been put at issue in this appeal,
the trial court's findings of fact denying any breach of implied warranties is properly supported by the evidence as
will be demonstrated below.
B.

The Trial Court's Findings of Fact are Adequately Supported by the Evidence.

Accepting, arguendo, that the doctrine of implied warranties of workmanship and habitability in new construction is
applicable under Utah law, cf., Tibbits v. Openshaw, 18 Utah
2d 442, 425 P.2d 160, 161 (1967), the Findings of the Court
that there is insufficient evidence in this case to support
Harward's claims that such warranties were breached by Jensen
Brothers should be upheld.
1.

Findings That a Party has Failed to Meet
Its Burden of Proof in an Issue Must be
Upheld If Reasonable Minds Could Remain
Unconvinced That the Burden Was Met.

The applicable standard or review of a Court's refusal
to find that the moving party has met its burden of proof is
set forth in Crane Co. v Dahle, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah, 1978),
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where the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision that the plaintiff had failed to prove its claim that
defendants had conspired to injure its business, saying:
We apply the standard rule of review:
that
we survey the evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court's findings, in this instance
more precisely stated, his refusal to 5ind in accordance with plaintiff's contentions.
5

That where the burden of proof on an issue
is on a party, and reasonable minds could remain
unconvinced thereon, then the refusal of the
court so to find must stand, see Walker Bank &
Trust Co. vs. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215,
341 P. 2d 944 [946 (1959)].
Id., at 873 and n. 5.

In reviewing the trial court's

findings that there was insufficient evidence to support
Harward's burden of proving breach of the warranties of
workmanship and habitability, it is necessary to briefly
examine the elements of proof applicable to each and the
evidence before the Court.
2.

The Tests for Breach of the Warranty of
Habitability and the Warranty of Workmanship are Distinctive and Require Different
Elements of Proof.

In order to establish a breach of implied warranties
in new construction, the plaintiff must prove either that
the structure was deficient in workmanship or in habitability.
The test for determining whether a breach has occurred is
very different for each.
The Supreme Court of Maine has described the standard of
"habitability" as follows:

-8-
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Habitability is a term difficult of precise
definition.
Every minor defect in a new home does
not necessarily make the structure uninhabitable.
On the other hand, the warranty should not be defined in such strict terms as to require that the
structure be deemed unlivable. • • • Whether or
not a particular defect renders the dwelling "unsuitable" necessarily requires inquiry as to whether
a reasonable person faced with such a defect would
be warranted in concluding that a major impediment
to habitation existed.
Banville v. Huckins, 407 A.2d 294, 297 (Me. 1979).

The Court

in Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepherd Builders Co., 470 P.2d
593, 598 (Colo. App. 1970), described the test for breach
of the warranty of workmanlike construction as follows:
For construction to be done in a good and
workmanlike manner, there is no requirement of perfection; the test is reasonableness in terms of
what the workman of average skill and intelligence
(the conscientious worker) would ordinarily do.
See Wimmer v. Down East Properties, Inc. 406 A.2d 88 (Me.
1979)

(Implied warranty in construction of new home that

work would be done in a reasonably skillful and workmanlike
manner.)
There is a distinct difference in the nature of the
liability concept applicable to each warranty.

Breach of

the warranty of habitability is based on strict liability,
i.e., "[n]egligence, knowledge, or fault of the vendor [of
the house]

need not be shown"

(Matalunas v Baker 569 S.W.2d

791, 794 (Mo. App. 1978)),. but only that the house has some
major impediment to habitation.

A breach of the warranty
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of workmanship, however, requires, by its very nature, some
default on the part of the builder.

This warranty is closely

analogous to, if not identical with, the warranty implied
in a personal services contract that the services will be
performed in a workmanlike manner.

The Idaho Supreme Court

held in Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 539 P.2d 584

(Id.

1975), that breach of such an implied warranty could not be
based on strict liability, but that fault must be shown:
The more vexing problem of theory is the distinction, if any, between the doctrines of implied
warranty and negligence in circumstances involving
the rendering of personal services. Although such
causes of action are generally thought to be independent of each other in the instant circumstances
they merge into one cause of action. A fundamental
component in a negligence action is the existence
of a duty • • • toward another and a breach thereof.
In circumstances involving the rendition of personal
services the duty upon the actor is to perform the
services in a workmanlike manner.

* * *
"Whether the tort standard of care is considered or the duty of care imposed by an
implied warranty of workmanlike performance is taken as the applicable standard,
in our view the resultant standard of care
required • • • is identical • • • • "
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 589.

The Court concluded that:

Since the case involved the rendition of
personal service, a cause of action does not exist
for breach of an implied warranty in the absence
of fault on the part of the actor.
Id. at 590.
(Kan. 1959)

See, In Re Talbott's Estate, 337 P.2d 986, 989
("A breach of an implied warranty.
-10-
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to do a

workmanlike job usually results from negligence or failure to
y

use due care and skill in performing the particular work.")
The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light
most favorable to the trial court's findings (as it must be)
supports the conclusion that reasonable minds could remain
unconvinced that JBC breached implied warranties in construetion of the house.
3.

A discussion of the evidence follows.

The Trial Court was Justified in Its
Refusal to Find that JBC Breached the
Warranty of Habitability Because Harward Presented No Evidence of a Major
Impediment to Habitation.

Unlike the instant case, in cases relied on by Harward
as examples of breaches of the warranty of habitability,
there was evidence in the record of major impediments to
habitability and findings by the respective courts that the
dwellings were in some way unfit for habitation due to defects.

For example, in House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash.

1969), there was evidence that settling of the soil had resulted in cracks in the foundation and other parts of the
house so severe that daylight showed through.

In spite of

efforts by both owner and builder to remedy the situation,
both parties evidently agreed that "the house was untenable
and unfit for further occupancy as a dwelling." Id., at 201.
The Washington Supreme Court held that such evidence supported the trial court's finding that the house was "unusable
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as a dwelling" and upheld judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
Id. at 203.
In Mulhern v. Hederich, 430 P.2d 470 (Colo. 1967), the
trial court had entered specific findings to the effect that
"heaving'' of the foundation had made the basement of the
house "uninhabitable" in that it "could not be used for the
purposes for which it had been designed, namely the division
thereof into rooms for use by members of the family."

When

combined with other construction defects the total damage
award was $3,500, fully 15 percent of the total cost of the
house, $25,000.

The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the judg-

ment noting that it would not disturb a judgment predicated
on findings of the trial court on disputed questions of fact.
Id. at 470.

The evidence before the trial court in the in-

stant case did not rise to this level.
At trial, Mr. Harward produced two witnesses who testif ied as to problems which had developed in the house and
introduced photographs illustrating those problems.

44(A)-(K).

Exhibits

The first, Jim Loveland, a contractor of one

year's experience, testified that the foundation was settling
at a rate faster than normal, resulting in the following
problems:
1.

Cracks in the garage floor which appear to
be merely cosmetic.
R. at 581; Ex. 44(A).

2.

A horizontal crack in a sheetrock wall, of
which there was evidence that it could have
-12-
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been caused by a large rack affixed to the
wall by Harward and holding a number of
bridles and other horse tack. R. at 581-82,
587-88, 655; Ex. 44{B).
3.

A slight shift {apparently about 5/8") in
a wall in the family room which contains
the fireplace. R. 582-83, 595; Ex. 44{C)
and (D). "This is the room that shows the
most movement." R. 582.

4.

Some damage to a concrete frame surrounding
a grate-covered opening in the rear of the
house. R. 583; Ex. 44(F).

5.

A doorframe which shifted out of square.
R. 5 8 3; Ex. 4 4 {G) and {H) •

6.

Slight separation at the juncture of two
walls in one corner of the family room.
R. 584; Ex. 44(!).
(Cracks are barely
visible in photograph.).

7.

A

crack, approximately 1/2" by 2', in the
exterior brick above a door. R. 584; Ex.
4 4 { J ) and ( K) •

All the problems described apparently occurred in one section
of the ground floor of the two-story structure containing the
garage and family room.

R. 587.

Harward's second witness,

Jack Potter, also a contractor, merely reviewed the photographs and stated he had seen the areas of the house they
depicted.

R. 590-95.

Mr. Loveland estimated the cost of repair to be $5,602.31.
R. 776.

There was no testimony that this estimate was reason-

able or that the items comprising the estimate were reasonably
necessary repairs.

Mr. Leon Jensen, vice-president of JBC

and an experienced builder with 12 years of cost estimating
experience, took exception to Mr. Loveland's estimate both
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as to the necessity for certain repairs and the reasonableness of the cost.

He testified that $2,000 would be a rea-

sonable charge to correct the problems in the house.
407-12.

R.

Cf. Hellbaum v. Burwell and Morford, 463 P.2d 225,

231, (Wash. App. 1969).

("Proof of mere expenditure does

not establish that the expenditure was reasonably necessary
or reasonable in amount.")
The purchase price of the house was $140,000.

Accepting

the $2,000 figure as the reasonable cost of repair (which the
trial court was entitled to do and obviously did in this case
[see Conclusion of Law No. 9 R. 296] ), then the cost of repairing the problems complained of was only 1.5 percent of the
total value of the house--a far cry from the 15 percent figure
in Mulhern v. Hederich, supra, relied on by Mr. Harward.
Mr. Jensen further testified on cross examination that
the damage which occurred from settling of the foundation
was not significant.

R. 763-64.

There was no testimony from

which it could be inferred that the problems complained of
in the house made the house unfit for the purpose for which
it was purchased, nor that such problems were a major impediment to habitability.
Certainly on this facts there was room for reasonable
men to doubt that the house contained major impediments to
habitability and the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Harward had not met his burden of proof on his claim of breach
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of the warranty of habitability must therefore be sustained.
4.

The Trial Court's Finding That There Was
Insufficient Evidence That The House Was
Not Constructed in a Workmanlike Manner
Is Also Supported by the Evidence.

As noted earlier, in order to prove breach of the warranty of workmanship, there must be some evidence of fault or
negligence on the part of the builder.

Cases in which courts

have found breaches of an implied warranty of workmanlike
construction, including those cited in the Harward Brief,
rely on evidence that defects were the result of improper
or faulty construction techniques.

See, e.g., Pollard v.

Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 525 P.2d 88, 90 (Cal. 1974)
(floor damage caused by use of undersized beams inadequate
for support, improper materials increased stress on floors);
Belt v. Spencer, 585 P.2d 972 (Colo. App. 1978)

(cracked

foundation and walls due to improper installation of drainage
system, improper grade, and improper installation of floor
and driveway slab); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo.
1964) (walls cracked to the point of cave-in due to construetion which violated county building codes).
The testimony of Mr. Loveland, Harward's contractor, was
that there was some greater than normal subsidence in the
foundation of the house.

R. 580-81.

There was absolutely no

evidence presented that this subsidence was due to any substandard workmanship or negligent construction on the part of
the builder, JBC.

In fact, Mr. Potter, a builder testifying
-15-
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for Mr. Harward admitted on cross examination that in his
experience foundation cracks do appear without any negligence
on the part of the builder.

R. 596.

Mr. Clarence Perry, an experienced excavator, testified
for JBC that he was employed to excavate the foundation of
the Harward house, that the soil was excavated with a hydrounit, the best method for problem soil, and that the excavation was done without mistakes and in original soil, which
would normally does not require compaction.

R. 639-642.

Mr. Leon Jensen, an officer of JBC who had previously supervised the pouring of over 100 foundations, testified that
JBC nevertheless did compact the soil after excavation, an
unusual extra step taken to ensure that the house would be
well constructed.

R. 754-56.

Further, it is clear that the Court had some doubts
after the testimony of Harward's witnesses, Loveland and
Potter, whether the problems in the house were defects or
due to defective workmanship.

R. 597, lines 21-24.

These

doubts could well have resulted from the fact that Hrward
presented no testimony of any accepted standard from which
wormanship or lack thereof could be judged.

Even if there

were some defects:
The builder-vendor is not required to construct a
perfect house. The test is one of reasonableness of
quality.
Matalunas v. Baker, supra at 794.
-16-
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Certainly on the record before the trial court, reasonable minds could remain unconvinced that Mr. Harward had
carried his burden of proof that JBC had breached a warranty
of workmanship in the construction of the house and the
Court's findings and judgment in that regard must therefore
be sustained.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT HARWARD HAD
NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN FRAUD AGAINST JBC FOR
ITS ALLEGED FAILURE TO DISCLOSE CERTAIN FACTS
ABOUT THE STATUS OF SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENTS
MUST BE UPHELD BECAUSE IT IS SUPPORTED BY A
PROPER FINDING OF FACT WHICH IS ITSELF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
A.

The Trial Court's Unchallenged Finding That JBC
Committed No Actionable Fraud Fully Supports
The Court's Judgment that Harward had no Cause
Of Action in Fraud Against JBC.

In Point

v

of his brief, Harward again does not attack

any specific finding of the trial court, but argues generally
that the trial court's judgment that Harward had no cause of
action in fraud against JBC is in error because JBC was guilty
of fraud in failing to notify Harward prior to his purchase
of the house that the subdivision improvements had not been
physically accepted by the City of Orem.
84.

Harward Brief at

As discussed earlier, where the Court's findings are

not specifically attacked, they are conclusive on appeal
and the only question is whether they support the judgment.
In Finding of Fact 18(a), the trial court specifically found:
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(a)
JBC
R.

•

•

•

There was no actionable fraud by
as alleged in Count I.

290.

As the gravamen of count I of the Third Party Counterclaim
against JBC sounds in fraud, the court's finding that there
was no fraud amply supports paragraph 4 of the Amended Judgrnent in which the court ruled against Harward and in favor of
JBC, no cause of action, on all issues in the Counterclaim,
Crossclaim and Third Party Complaint.

R. 300.

In any event, it is clear that there was substantial
evidence on which the court could have based its finding that
no fraud had occurred and the necessary inference to be drawn
from that finding that Harward failed to meet his burden
of producing "clear and convincing" evidence on each essential element of fraud.

Beckendorf v. Beckendorf, 457 P.2d

603, 607-07 (Wash. 1969).
B.

There is Substantial Evidence in the Record
Which Supports the Trial Court's Finding That
JBC Committed no Actionable by Fraud.

In reviewing attacks on specific findings of the trial
court:
[T]his court is constrained to look at the whole
of the evidence in the light favorable to the
trial court's findings, including any fair inferences to be drawn from the evidence and.all
of the circumstances shown. The trial court's
findings shall not be disturbed unless the evidence is such that all reasonable minds would be
persuaded to the contrary. (Footnotes omitted.)
Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 .2d 751, 753 (Utah 1977).
-18-
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The

burden for overturning a trial court's findings should be even
more stringent where the appellant's burden at trial was to
produce clear and convincing evidence of fraud.

It is clear

in the instant case that Harward did not meet that burden
at trial.
The allegations set forth in his Third Party Counterclaim show the nature of the fraud that Harward sought to
prove. In Count I, Harward alleged that at the time that
he purchased the house, the subdivision in which the house
was built had not been approved by the city of Orem as required by law.

He further alleged that JBC knew that the

subdivision had not been approved and knowingly failed to
disclose this information to Harward, who justifiably relied
on such nondisclosure in purchasing the property.

Harward

alleges that he was injured by such nondisclosure because
failure to obtain municipal approval of a subdivision results
in the property being left without public services such as
fire protection, snow removal, street repair and police protection, leaving Harward with a house of

dirn~nished

value

which could not be sold until the subdivision was approved.
He seeks damages in the amount of $250,000.00.

Third party

counterclaim and Complaint, paragraphs 10 through 17, R. 35-36.
It should be noted that JBC was not the subdividor but
had merely built the Barrington House on a lot owned by Taylor National, Inc., the plaintiff in this case.

R. 7-8; 12-13.
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At trial the official plat of the subject subdivision,
Executive Estates, plat C, was introduced in evidence as
Exhibit 26.

The plat map shows that it was accepted by the

legislative body, the City Council of Orem, on January 4, 1977:
The City Council of Orem, County of Utah, approves
this subdivision and hereby accepts the dedication
of all streets • • • •
It was filed with the Utah County Recorder on February 22,
1977.

This acceptance and recordation of the plat occurred

several months before the house was sold to Harward. Ex. 24,
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, dated October
27, 1977.
There was testimony by John

w.

Jones, Director of Pub-

lie Works of the City of Orem that after a subdivision has
been accepted and properly recorded the lots may built upon,
subject only to the building permit process.

R. 576.

There

was no claim that JBC failed to obtain a proper building
permit.

Mr. Jones, subject to JBC's objection as to materi-

ality (R573, lines 18-23), also described the official approval process necessary to accomplish the subdivision of
land within the city of Provo.

He noted that one of the

conditions precedent to recording the plat is that the subdivider file a performance bond ensuring the proper installation of off-site improvements,including streets, sewer,
curb, gutter sidewalk, etc.

R. 574-75.

Although the plat

can be approved and filed at that time, he testified that
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the street improvements "are not accepted until such time
as they are installed properly and the final inspections
are made." R.

575.

Mr. Jones testified that this final accep-

tance occurred on October 15,

1979.

There was no testimony

from any witness that because the improvements were not accepted, the subdivision was not provided with police and
fire protection, sewer and other services as alleged in the
Third Party Counterclaim.

Clearly the subdivision approval

discussed in the Harward counterclaim relates to approval
of the plat and not to approval of the physical improvements
as installed in the subdivision.

On that basis JBC's objec-

tion on grounds of relevance and materiality was well taken
and further testimony in that regard was probably not considered by the trial court and should not be considered by
this court.
In any event, Harward simply did not present sufficient
evidence on the elements required for proof of fraud.

Accept-

ing the elements of fraud as set forth in Stuck v Delta Land
and Water Company 227 P. 791, 795 (Utah 1924) as quoted at
page 75 of the Harward Brief, Harward failed in his proof
as follows:
(1)

There was no representation made about the improve-

ments by JBC.

There is no evidence in the record that any

representative of JBC made any representation or statement
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about subdivision improvements; in fact, there is no evidence
these improvements were even discussed before the sale of
the house.

In his brief Harward apparently recognizes this

problem and attempts to develop a concept of fraudulent nondisclosure.

Harward Brief at 75-77.

According to Harward's

own authorities, however, silence only becomes actionable
where there is a duty to disclose material facts on the part
of one of the parties.
in the instant case.

Such a duty simply did not exist
There was no confidential or fiduciary

relationship between the parties.

There was no inequality

in condition or knowledge between the parties:

Although

JBC was an experienced homebuilder, Leon Harward was himself
an experienced professional real estate salesman (R. 629)
with undoubtedly equal knowledge as to laws, customs and
practices relating to the approval of subdivisions and subdivision improvements.

Nor was there any evidence that

JBC had knowledge that Harward was acting under the mistaken
belief that the subdivision improvements had not been physically approved by the city, or that Harward was relying on
JBC for such information.

The sale of the house was an arm's

length transaction between an equally sophisticated buyer
and seller.

(2)

There was no knowledge on the part of JBC of the

falsity of any representation.

Even if the court could have
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found that there was a representation or an actionable nondisclosure, there is no evidence of any kind in the record
which indicates that JBC or anyone associated with JBC knew
that the subdivision improvements had not been finally physically accepted by the city of Orem.
(3)

There is no evidence that any alleged false repre-

sentation was material.

It is apparent that the subdivision

improvements were at least visually acceptable to Harward
at the time that he bought the house because he in fact did
go through with the deal; there is no evidence in the record
that there was anything wrong with those improvements at
the time of the transaction.

Given that fact and the further

fact that there was a performance bond ensuring that the
improvements to be properly installed it is difficult to
see how a buyer would be materially affected in his decision
whether to make a deal by knowledge that the subdivision
improvements had not been physically accepted by the city.
In fact the performance bond evidently did insure that the
problems which subsequently occurred with the improvements
were satisfactorily taken care of by October 1979.

R.

576-77, 604.
(4)

Harward did not prove he was damaged by an alleged

misrepresentation.

The testimony relating to Harward's

inability to sell the house is at best equivocal and was
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met with some doubt by the judge at the time it was given.
R. 656-57.

It consists almost entirely of testimony that

the subdivision improvements were in visibly bad condition,
that at the time of trial there were seven houses on the
block for sale (there is no evidence of how many houses had
been for sale prior to the time of trial), and that during
the past year or two only one house had been sold on the
block.

R

656-58.

Harward testified that he believed he

could not get $140,000 for the house, but on cross-examination it was shown tht he had listed the house for sale at
$150,000 and had never tried to sell it for $140,000.
714-16.

R.

The court was certainly justified in assuming that

there were other equally possible causes for the failure
of houses in the subdivision to sell besides the street conditions.
In summary, Harward failed to present evidence necessary to sustain several important elements which he was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence in order
to establish fraud on the part of JBC.

There was substan-

tial evidence to support the trial court's finding that there
was no fraud, and its judgment of no cause of action based
on that finding should be sustained by this court.

-24-
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c.

Harward's Assertion on Appeal that there was
Negligent Misrepresentation as to the Status of
the Subdivision Improvements is not Properly
Before this Court as it was Never a Part of
His Claim Below.

It should be mentioned that Harward also apparently
claims in his brief that the trial court should have found
that there was at least a negligent misrepresentation as
to the status of the improvements vis a vis Orem City.

How-

ever, Harward never made any claims of negligent misrepresentation in his original Third Party Counterclaim, nor was
there any amendment made or requested to that effect. In
Ellis v Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962), this Court held,
in upholding the lower court's dismissal of a complaint
alleging fraud, that:
In plaintiff's complaint it is specifically
alleged that the defendants had knowledge of the
falsity of the supposed representation that induced the belief that the lots were part of an
approved subdivision. We conclude that this
knowledge forecloses an action for negligent
misrepresentation • • •
Id. at 385.

In other words, Howard cannot claim in his

counterclaim that JBC knew the subdivision had not been properly approved, and then, in his brief attacking the court's
finding that there was no fraud, allege that if JBC didn't
know, it should have known.

The claims are mutually exclu-

sive and an allegation of negligent misrepresentation should
not be allowed to be made for the first time at trial or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-25-

on this appeal.

Moreover, the evidence presented to the

trial court, as discussed above, simply does not supi;x>rt
a claim of negligent misrepresentation on the part of JBC,
as JBC made no representation at all regarding the status
of the improvements.
POINT IV
HARWARD PROVED NONE OF HIS CLAIMED DEFENSES
TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE TRUST DEED, AND THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT THAT THE TRUST DEED NOTE
WAS IN DEFAULT AND THAT THE TRUST DEED BE
FORECLOSED MUST THEREFORE BE SUSTAINED.

A.

The Trial Court's Finding that there was no
Meeting of the Minds Between Harward and JBC
Requiring JBC to Accept Solely Property in
Payment of the Trust Deed Note Supports its
Judgment Enforcing the Trust Deed Note by
Allowing Sale of the Trust Deed Property.

In Points VI and VII of his Brief, Harward evidently
contests the judgment of the trial court that the Harwards
are in default in payment of the Trust Deed Note and that
JBC may cause the trustee to sell the property secured by
the Trust Deed (Amended Judgment, paragraph 5, R. 300-301)
and its judgment denying reformation of the Trust Deed as
requested in Harward's Amendment to Third Party Complaint.
Amendment, paragraph 18, R.
4, R. 300.

186; Amended Judgment, paragraph

Harward's arguments as to both points revolve

around the related claims that JBC agreed to take land in
trade for the amount owing on the Trust Deed Note, that JBC
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is estopped from denying that it agreed to take land in
trade, and that the Trust Deed Note should be reformed to
reflect this agreement.
Again, Harward has attacked the judgment of the trial
court without attacking its specific findings of fact.

Thus,

the court's findings are conclusive on appeal, and, if they
support the judgment, it must be upheld.

The finding of

fact applicable to this issue is Finding of Fact 18(d):
(d) The evidence was insufficient to compel or
justify any reformation of the Trust Deed or Trust
Deed Note (Exhibit 59) acknowledged by Leon Harward
as executed and delivered to JBC with respect to the
Bartington House, and the court specifically finds
that no meeting of the minds occurred between Leon
Harward or Judith Harward, his wife, with JBC pertaining to acceptance of property or sales of real
estate in lieu of the cash required pursuant to
terms of the Trust Deed Note.
The remedy of reformation is available to a party who
proves that due to mutual mistake or fraud or inequitable
conduct on the part of another party, the written contract
between them fails to reflect their agreement.

Ingram v.

Forrer, 563 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977); George v. Fritsch
Loan & Trust Co., 256 P. 400, 403 (Utah 1924).

The thresh-

hold question is whether there was an initial agreement to
which the writing may be conformed.

The trial court's find-

ing that there was no meeting of the minds between the various parties as to acceptance of property in lieu of cash,
together with its finding that the Harwards had no defense
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to enforcement of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note (Finding of Fact 19(g) R. 293) fully support those parts of the
trial court's Amended Judgment which relate to enforecement
of those instruments.
Should this court decide that the trial court's findings
are properly attacked on review it must still uphold those
findings and the resulting judgment on the ground that they
are amply supported by the evidence, as will be demonstrated
below.
B.

The Trial Court's Finding that there was no
Agreement by JBC to Accept only Property in
Payment of the Trust Deed Note is Fully Supported
by the Evidence and Harward Failed to Adequately
Prove his Defenses to Enforcement of the Note
and the Trust Deed.

Although it is the duty of this court to review the
facts as well as the law in reviewing an equity proceeding,
such as the instant, involving application of the equitable
remedies of estoppel and reformation of an instrument, the
court has imposed some bounds on its scope of review.

As

the court stated in Del Porta v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d 811, 812
(Utah 1972):
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this
action to avoid deeds is one in equity upon which
this court has both the prerogative and the duty to
review and weigh the evidence, and to determine the
facts.
However, in the practical application of
that rule it is well established in our decisional
law that due to the advantaged position of the trial
court, in close proximity to the parties and the
witnesses, there is indulged a presumption of cor-
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rectness of his findings and judgment, with the
burden upon the appellant to show they were in
error; and where the evidence is in conflict, we
do not upset his findings merely because we may
have reviewed the matter differently, but do so
only if the evidence preponderates against them.
(Footnotes omitted.)
See Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815, 816 (Utah
1974).

This must be particularly true where the evidence

required to sustain plaintiff's burden of persuasion is required to be both clear and convincing, as in the instant
case where the doctrines of equitable estoppel and reformation of instruments are invoked.

Tribble v. Reely, 557 P.2d

813, 818 (Mont. 1976) ("[E]stopppel is not favored and will
only be sustained upon clear and convincing evidence.");
Weight v. Bailey, 147 P. 899, 903 (Utah 1915)

("[T]he pre-

surnption that the instrument correctly evidences the agreement of the parties, where reformation is resisted, must be
overcome by proof which is clear and convincing.")
Harward's assertion that there was mutual mistake
justifying reformation of the Trust Deed Note to reflect
JBC's alleged agreement to take land in lieu of cash in payrnent and that JBC is estopped from denying that there was
such an agreement will be discussed in turn below.
1.

There was Insufficient Evidence of
Mutual Mistake to Justify Reformation
of the Trust Deed Note.

Reformation of a written contract on grounds of mistake
requires that the mistake "be mutual, and that both parties
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understood the contract as the complaint or petition alleges
it ought to have been, and as in fact it was except for the
mistake.

•

•

•

II

Ingram, supra at 182 (Emphasis by the court).

Evidence of mutual mistake must be "clear and convincing":
An honest difference of understanding as to what the
contract was is fatal to reformation, for in such case
there is no meeting of the minds of the parties and
no preexisting agreement to which the written instrument can be conformed.
It is often stated that reformation will not be granted
on [internally] contradictory evidence.
(Footnote
omitted.)
Id.

See 66 Arn Jur 2d, "Reformation of Instruments", S 125.

The evidence before the court on Harward's claim that JBC
agreed to accept property, and not money, in payment of the
Trust Deed Note was at best contradictory and simply did
not reach the level of "clear and convincing".
Harward prepared two Earnest Money Receipts offering
to purchase the Barrington House from JBC.

The first (Exhi-

bit 60) contains a provision that $56,600 of the price of
the house will be "equity in ground".

That Earnest Money

was signed by Harward, but was not accepted by JBC.
732-33, 746.

R.

Leon Jensen, an officer of JBC, testified that

the unsigned Earnest Money was rejected by JBC because the
provision for trading of equity in ground for a portion of
the purchase price was not acceptable.

R. 732-35.

The

Earnest Money Receipt subsequently signed by both parties
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(Exhibit 24) contained no provision that land or equity in
land would be accepted as a portion of the purchase price.
That Earnest Money bears the date of October 27, 1977.
The next day, on October 28, 1977, the Harwards signed
a Trust Deed Note to JBC for $45,600 (Exhibit 59) representing a portion of the down payment on the property, and to
secure the Trust Deed Note a Trust Deed of the same date
was executed {Exhibit 45).

The Trust Deed Note provides

that the principal amount will be paid "in full on or before
May 1, 1978" and shows no indication that any provision is
made for payment in other than money.

1

Harward testified that when he first spoke with Leon
Jensen about acquiring the Barrington House with Leon Jensen,
they discussed the nature of the consideration to be paid:
A.

I asked Leon if they would be interested in taking
ground as a down payment.

Q.

Were you given an answer to that question?

A.

They would entertain it, they would talk about
it.

Q.

Are you telling us what Mr. Leon Jensen said?

A.

Yes.
He said that they would consider it and take
a look at it.

1 "Unless the parties agree otherwise, or an obligee consents
to receive some other medium, payment of an obligation may
be made only in money."
60 Am Jur 2d "Payment," §22.
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R. 613.

Mr. Harward testified that subsequently, from early

October or November until the next spring (both before and
after signing the Earnest Money, according to him) he took
Leon and Marvin Jensen of JBC to look at several parcels
of property.

R. 614-621.

Leon Jensen contradicts Harward's

claim that there was any discussion of accepting property
in lieu of cash until after the Earnest Money and the Trust
Deed Note were signed.

R. 736.

Only three of the approxi-

mately twelve parcels which Harward testifies he showed to
Jensen were shown to them prior to the due date of the Note,
May 1, 1978.

R. 718-719.

It is apparent from Harward's

testimony that he did not own any of the property (see R.
614-621), but was attempting to interest the Jensens in buying property belonging to others on which he would receive a
real estate commission.

R. 673, 737-739.

It is also clear

that during the entire period in which Leon Harward was showing property to the Jensens, the Jensens were also looking at
other property with other realtors because they needed a
project to develop at that time.

R. 742.

The Jensens' testimony was very specific that they
expected the Note to be paid in money, but were willing to
take land if suitable land could be produced for them by
Mr. Harward:
A.

[Leon Jensen]
Yes. We discussed the possibility
of taking property in exchange for this Trust Deed
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and Notes.
If there were some presented that were
acceptable and it was feasible • . • •

* * *

R.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Leon Harward and myself.

Q.

And what was said?

A.

He asked me if we would consider taking the property that he had in exchange for all or part of
the down payment for that home.

Q.

And what did you say?

A.

I said we'd consider it.

Q.

• • • Were you required to do so in your understanding?

A.

No.

And who was present?

736.

Q.

(By Mr. Norton} • • • From the time the Trust Deed
Note was signed, Exhibit 45, to this time, have
you or to your knowledge any other agent of Jensen
Brothers Construction agreed to accept land and
not to require cash in payment of the Trust Deed
Note?

A.

[Marvin Jensen]

R. 748.

Absolutely not.

Leon Jensen testified that at the signing of the

Trust Deed Note and again at the closing on the house Harward
told him that when the Note was due "if he had to he would
take out a second mortgage on his home or some other property he had and pay us in cash."

R. 735.

Further, at least twice before the May 1, 1978, due
date on the Trust Deed Note, Marvin Jensen, president of
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JBC, called Harward to adivse him that JBC expected to be
paid on the Note.

R. 400-403.

The Jensens continued to consider accepting equity in
property or some sort of property deal for the amount of
the Note after the May 1, 1978, due date because of their
feeling that it would be difficult to otherwise collect from
Harward.

As Leon Jensen testified:

A.

You are asking me what attempts I know of to collect the money?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Leon Harward and I had several conversations in
which I, this was at or around the time of the
Trust Deed and Note being due, I had several conversations about that; and I informed him of our
desire to collect on that, it was becoming due
and we didn't want the thing to drag on, that we
wanted to collect.

Q.

What was his response?

A.

He assured me that there would be no problem.

Q.

After May of 1978, there was a reason why you--were
there reasons why you allowed him to show you property?

A.

Yes.
It was obvious to us and he, I think, very
well, I think it was very soon after the Note became due he told me that he just did not have the
funds to pay the Note off. And the reason why we
still considered property in exchange is to collect somehow on the Note.

R. 741-743.

In an attempt to consummate some sort of deal by which
they could be paid out of the now over-due Note, the Jensens
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ultimately, in November of 1978, entered into an Earnest
Money Agreement with parties known as Memmott and Johnson
on a 25-acre parcel (the Williamson property) shown to them
by Harward.

As part of the deal, Memmott and Johnson were

to accept the Trust Deed Note as a portion of the purchase
price.

Exhibit 38.

In his Brief at pages 90-92 Harward

argues that this proves that JBC had agreed to accept land
in trade for equity.

It does prove that JBC had agreed,

in the context of that deal, to accept land, but not that
JBC was obligating itself to accept only land and not money.
In fact a letter quoted by Harward at page 91 of his Brief
indicated that this was merely an accommodation to Harward
and not an indication of some binding agreement:
The arrangements to include your Note in this deal on
Williamson's property should be a benefit to both of
us.
It is, as you know, because of these negotiations
that we have held off on our foreclosure of your home.
Exhibit 55.

The "Williamsen deal" was never closed for rea-

sons not before the court in this matter.

R. 762.

The only evidence presented by Harward wnich appears
to support his contention that JBC agreed to accept only
property in satisfaction of the Trust Deed Note besides his
own rather ambiguous testimony was a pre-closing letter to
Scott Harrison of American Home Mortgage, Inc., the institution financing the bulk of Harward's purchase of the Barrington House, and signed by Leon Jensen, indicating that JBC
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had taken equity in property which Mr. Harward owned as a
down payment on the house.

Exhibit 37.

This evidently re-

sulted in the Settlement Statement (Exhibit 36}, indicating
that part of the consideration for the sale was a "Land Trade"
in the amount of $56,600.

It is clear, however, that this

letter was written by JBC at the specific request of Leon
Harward.

R.

Mr. Harward, in fact, so testified:

Q.

(By Mr. Norton}
I show you what's previously
been marked and offered as Exhibit 37, proporting
to be a letter from Leon Jensen to Scott Harrison.
Do you remember seeing that letter?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And that letter was written at your request, wasn't
it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You knew at the time that property had not been
transferred to Jensen Brothers?

A.

I knew that they had not received property yet,
yes.

Q.

But you requested Leon Jensen to write that letter?

A.

I asked him if he would.

Q.

And the reason for that is so that you could obtain
that first mortgage?

A.

That's true.

708.

Thus, it is clear from the evidence that the trial court
was justified in concluding that there was never a binding
agreement that JBC would accept only property in satisfaction
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of the Trust Deed Note.

In fact, the evidence which Harward

cites in Point VI of his Brief as supportive of his position
that there was such an agreement is equally persuasive evidence of JBC's agreement to merely accommodate him by accepting property because of his lack of funds to pay the Trust
Deed Note in cash.

To the extent other testimony appears

to contradict this, the court may "assume that [the trial
court] believed those aspects of the evidence which are in
accord with his findings and judgment."

Foster v. Blake

Heights Corporation, supra at 816.
Even if the evidence were sufficiently clear and convincing to demonstrate that the parties had agreed as a
general proposition to exchange land for the payment due
under the Trust Deed Note, it still cannot be concluded that
the necessary meeting of the minds occurred, because the
agreement would still be too indefinite to enforce.
v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961).

Valcare

Such an "agree-

ment" leaves many material questions unanswered such as
what property JBC was to accept in payment for the amount
of the Note or the standard by which an appropriate property
would be designated.
Further, as Harward apparently did not own property
he proposed to trade, what form was the "trade" to take--a
commission to be deducted from the sales price or a purchase
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of property by Harward with resale to JBC at a higher price
to cover the amount of the Note?

None of these significant

questions is answerable from the testimony and other evidence
before the court, and for that reason alone it must conclude
that no meeting of the minds took place and no reformation of
the Trust Deed Note is appropriate or possible.
2.

There Was Insufficient Evidence of Inequitable Conduct on the Part of JBC to
Justify Reformation of the Trust Deed Note.

The courts of Utah require "clear and convincing" evidence to justify reformation of a written instrument on the
grounds of fraud or inequitable conduct as well as on grounds
of mutual mistake.

Weight v. Bailey, supra at 903.

Harward argues in his Brief at Point VII that if there
was no mutual mistake justifying reformation, then there
was inequitable conduct by JBC in encouraging Harward to
spend time and effort in locating land for JBC under the
false impression that he need not pay money in satisfaction
of the Trust Deed Note when JBC secretly intended not to
perform if such land was located.

Harward cites no portion

of the record for this proposition because there is no support for it in the record.
The facts previously discussed clearly contradict any
claim of inequitable conduct on the part of JBC and there
is thus no justification for reformation on that ground.
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3.

There Was Insufficient Evidence to Estep
JBC from Denying an Agreement to Accept
Property in Sole Payment of the Trust
Deed Note.

Accepting the elements of equitable estoppel set forth
in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm., 602
P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), as stated in the Harward Brief at
86, there is simply insufficient clear and convincing evidence in the record to support Harward's claim that JBC is
estopped to deny it agreed to accept a property trade in
lieu of cash payment of the Trust Deed Note:
(a)

JBC made no statement nor took any action

inconsistent with the requirements that the Note be satisfied in money.

The evidence before the court shows that

JBC agred to make some sort of property exchange as an accommodation to Harward but not that it was required to do
so.
(b)

Harward's actions were not taken in reliance

on any representation by JBC that it would take only property in satisfaction of the Note.

Harward claims that in

reliance on JBC's statments and acts he failed to pay money
on the Trust Deed Note, thus allowing it to go into default.
There is no evidence in the record that Harward had the money
to pay the Note when due.

In fact, JBC's agreement to take

a property exchange after the Note's due date was shown to
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be an accommodation to Harward because he did not have the
money to pay the Note.
Harward further claims that in reliance on JBC he spent
time and effort in seeking property for JBC he would not
otherwise have expended.

This claim is unsupportable.

Har-

ward was a realtor who dealt in such properties for a living.
In dealing ith JBC he was pursuing his normal line of work
and expected to get a commission on any deal he made for
them.

The fact that his commission on such a deal would

go to pay the Note was a benefit to Harward and is really
not relevant in any event.
(c)

Any injury to Harward is a result of his fail-

ure to abide by the terms of the Trust Deed Note and is not
due to any action of JBC.

Rather than foreclose the Trust

Deed when the due date had passed without payment, JBC continued to accommodate Harward by seeking a property deal
which would allow satisfaction of the Note.

There was no

evidence that they acted in bad faith in any potential land
deal; on the contrary, they spent much fruitless time and
effort in seekino a deal which would involve Harward.
Harward never paid the Note and now asks the court to
rule that JBC's forebearance and cooperation with him throughout their business relationship should bar JBC from seeking
the money which is due it by a remedy which it bargained
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for in good faith, foreclosure of the trust deed.

Harward's

position itself is inequitable and this court should uphold
the judgment of the trial court and allow the trustee's sale
to go forward as ordered.
CONCLUSION
Harward has attacked those portions of the judgment
of the court against him and in favor of JBC on his claims
that JBC breached implied warranties of habitability and
workmanship, that JBC committed fraud in allegedly failing
to disclose to Harward that subdivision improvements had
not been approved by Orem City, and that the Trust Deed Note
between Harward and JBC should be reformed to reflect an
agreement that JBC take only property in payment of the Note,
and be estopped from denying that agreement.

However, the

judgment of the trial court is adequately supported by findings of fact and those findings of fact have substantial
support in the record.

Therefore, Harward's contentions

on this appeal must be denied, and the judgment of the trial
court upheld.
Dated

~

this~

day of May, 1981.
& MARTINEAU

By

~--==--s:;;_-=-----~~-=-__.a--~~~~~

A. Dennis Norton
Stephen Roth
Attorneys for Respondent
Jensen Bros. Construction Co.
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